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1. Introduction 
 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention and its legitimacy in international law has 
long been a subject of controversy. The critical issue in any debate on humanitarian 
intervention is the need to harmonize intervention with the principle of sovereignty, 
which in essence requires that a sovereign state be treated as an independent 
political unit, its territorial integrity be respected, and it be allowed to pursue its 
domestic affairs without external interference. These stipulations are essentially 
those regulating inter-state relations that have evolved since the peace of 
Westphalia and have been codified as core principles of international law. 
Indeed, the issue is a conflict between the ban on the use of force and respect for 
sovereignty on the one hand, and the duty to uphold and promote human rights on 
the other. Should the emphasis be on preventing the use of force between states 
and maintaining stable relations between them or does the protection of citizens’ 
fundamental rights deserve priority?  The relationship between these two interests 
is complicated and attracted me to study the subject. 
From an international law point of view, assessment of humanitarian intervention 
entails taking account not only of the ban on the use of force between states and 
respect for territorial integrity, but also of the obligation to protect human rights. Both 
form an essential part of the international order based on the UN charter, and both are 
of great importance to the stability and durability of that order. But there is a growing 
international concern for the protection of human rights to the effect that sovereignty 
implies responsibility and thus when egregious human rights violation occur, 
intervention is justified to protect those rights. 
 
 This paper will address the tension between state sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention. The objective of the legal analysis in this paper is to determine whether 
the legal and legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention exists under international 
law and if so, when and under whose authority. 
The scope of this paper is limited to the problem of intervention to address man-made 
humanitarian crises. Therefore, it will refrain from discussing foreign interventions to 
alleviate the consequences of natural disasters. 
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Before the discussion of historical evolution, practice, legality and legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention, it would be appropriate to make some observations on the 
concept of state sovereignty. This is relevant because debates over humanitarian 
intervention are embedded in the changing character of state sovereignty. 
The inquiry into the issue of the compatibility of humanitarian intervention with 
sovereignty will start with a chapter on the state sovereignty. This chapter contains 
five sections. The first section discusses the concept of sovereign equality of states. It 
will demonstrate states’ formal equality in law. The second section discusses the 
corollary of sovereign equality, that is, the principle of non-intervention. The third 
section examines the current legal rules governing the ban on the use of force between 
states. The forth section will analyse the exception to the general prohibition on the 
use of force in international law. The fifth section examines sovereignty in relation to 
a growing international concern for the protection of human rights and the right of 
intervention towards those ends. The clarification of that matter will create the 
necessary background for the later discussion of the legality and legitimacy of 
intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
Chapter 3 discusses the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It will begin with the 
definition of the principle of humanitarian intervention and then examines the relation 
between the doctrine and the Responsibility to Protect. It will clarify and delimit the 
terms properly. This chapter proceeds with the discussion of historical evolution of 
the principle of humanitarian intervention. It will demonstrate its development 
throughout different stages of history, and finally it will review cases of actual 
interventions that occurred in the Pre-Charter, during Cold War, and in the Post-Cold 
War periods. 
Chapter 4 analyses the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in 
international law. It will discuss two categories of interventions on humanitarian 
grounds. The first is humanitarian intervention with a Security Council mandate. This 
section will analyse the power and role of the UNSC in interventions on humanitarian 
grounds and the requirements under the UN charter for such interventions. The 
second category of intervention is the one that carried out without a Security Council 
mandate or the so-called unilateral humanitarian intervention. This section will 
examine whether unilateral intervention is lawful in light of the UN Charter and 
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Customary international law. The final inquiry is to explore justifications, under 
international law, for unilateral humanitarian intervention in special circumstances. 
 In this way the paper will determine whether the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is compatible with state sovereignty in international law. It concludes that 
sovereignty implies responsibility, and when egregious human rights violations occur, 
intervention is justified to protect those ends. The redefinition of sovereignty to 
include a duty to respect human rights is reinforced in contemporary international 
law. The UNSC is empowered to conduct or authorise humanitarian intervention in 
situations internal crisis produce humanitarian catastrophe with, or even without, 
cross-border repercussions. Unilateral humanitarian intervention may be justified, in 
extreme cases, on moral and political grounds but has no legal basis under positive 
international law. 
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2. State sovereignty 
One of the fundamental principles on which international law and relations rest on is the 
principle of state sovereignty. It is the foundation of inter-state relations and the basis of 
the modern world order. Most of the basic norms, rules and practices of international 
relations have grounded on the premise of state sovereignty.1 
The original meaning of sovereignty is related to the idea of supremacy. According to Black’s 
Law Dictionary, sovereignty means a person, body, or state vested with independent and 
supreme authority.2 In the Westphalia International System, the ultimate power holder is 
the state. This particular view of sovereignty maintains that since state is under the legal 
influence of no superior authority, sovereignty resides in the state, and to be sovereign is to 
be subject to no higher power. The result of this doctrine of state sovereignty is that human 
rights are regarded as a matter of domestic and not international concern.3 
Scholars of 16th and 17th centuries, such as Bodin, Grotius and Hobbes, regarded sovereignty 
as a final political authority. Bodin defines sovereignty as: “the most high, absolute and 
perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a commonweal...the greatest power to 
command.”4 Hugo Grotius defined sovereignty as: “that power whose acts are not subject 
to the control of another, so that they may be made void by the act of any other human 
will.”5 Hobbes regarded sovereignty as: “absolute, unified, inalienable, based upon a 
voluntary but irrevocable contract.”6 
In spite of these claims of sovereignty as an absolute power of state, some limitations on 
state sovereignty are widely accepted. State sovereignty is not unlimited. Limitations are 
imposed upon it both by customary law and treaty rules. Such limitations on state 
sovereignty particularly relates to immunity of foreign states and treatment of individuals.7   
Regarding the treatment of individuals, Cassese pointed out that customary international 
rules on respect for human rights impose upon any state the obligation to respect the 
fundamental human rights of its own nationals, of foreigners residing or passing through its 
territory and also stateless persons.8 However, these rules do not regulate in details how a 
state must treat individuals. Rather, besides imposing certain obligations with respect to 
                                                          
1
  See, e.g. Abiew (1999) P.23 
2
  Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) P. 1430 
3
  See, Abiew (1999) p. 25 
4
  Quoted in Ibid, p.27 
5
  Quoted in ibid 
6
  Quoted in ibid, p.28  
7
  Cassese (2005) P.98 
8
  Ibid, p. 123 
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foreigners, customary rules require all state not fragrantly violate human rights.9 Rules on 
how a state has to treat individuals can only found in human rights treaties.10 
Indeed, the principle of state sovereignty is recognized in the UN Charter as one of the main 
principles of the organization.11 At the same time, state sovereignty is limited under the UN 
system. According to the charter, sovereignty is not a barrier to the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter12, in particular, actions by the 
Security Council when taking measures with respect to a threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace or acts of aggression.13 
The principle of sovereignty can be explained by making two kinds of distinctions. It can be 
divided into “Internal sovereignty” and “External sovereignty”. Internally, sovereignty 
connotes the exercise of supreme authority by states within their individual territorial 
boundaries, and externally, it connotes equality of status between states consisting of the 
community of states.14 It would seem to be the case that state sovereignty is not recognized 
in absolute terms. Although the formal principle of sovereignty remains the norm of 
international law, its contents has shifted with respect to human rights.  
2.1 Sovereign equality of states 
Traditional international law based on a set of norms that protect the sovereignty of states 
and recognize their formal legal equality. The principle of sovereign equality was first 
incorporated in the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648, whereby the ruling monarchy was 
the exclusive, legitimate authority within his or her territory and could act within that 
territory without interference from other powers. In fact, this principle was present in 
customary international law as well as in the League of Nations. 
 The principle of sovereign equality of states, enshrined in the UN Charter, recognizes that 
all states are equal in law regardless of their inequalities in other respects, such as inequality 
of size, wealth, population, strength or level of civilization.15 According to Article 2(1) of the 
Charter, the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
members. In the Norwegian Ship-owners Claims Case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
emphasized that: “International law and justice are based upon the principle of equality 
between states.”16(Emphasis added). 
                                                          
9
  Ibid 
10
  Ibid 
11
  UN Charter arts 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) 
12
  Ibid, art 2(7) 
13
  Ibid, art 39 
14
  Abiew (1999) p.24 
15
  Cassese (2005)P.48 
16 Norway  V. USA 
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According to Brownlie, the sovereign equality of states represents the basic constitutional 
principle of international law, which governs a society comprising primarily of states with 
similar legal personality.17 Similarly, Cassese pointed out that: “Of various principles, this is 
unquestionably the only one on which there is unqualified agreement and which has the 
purport of all groups of states, regardless of ideologies, political leanings, and 
circumstances.”18 
The principle of sovereign equality of states was reaffirmed in the 1970 Declaration along 
the lines of Article 2(1) of the UN charter. This Declaration reads in part: “all states enjoy 
sovereign equality, they have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the 
international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or 
other nature.”19 This Declaration applies to all states, regardless of their membership in the 
United Nations.20 
In short, the state’s sovereignty under international law is its legal independence from other 
states, and the legal authority or competence of a state is limited and limitable only by 
international law but not by the domestic law of other states.21The principal corollary of 
sovereign equality is the duty of non-intervention in exclusive jurisdiction of other states. 
 
2.2 Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states 
The principle of ‘no-intervention in a state’s internal affairs used to be a rule of traditional 
international law. There is no doubt that this principle remains well-established in 
contemporary international law.   
The principle of non-intervention is recognized in the UN Charter Article 2(7) which provides 
that: 
 Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
chapter VII. 
However, practice under Article 2(7) has developed over time, and its practical importance 
is by now significantly reduced. Shaw maintains: “this paragraph intended as a practical 
restatement and reinforcement of domestic jurisdiction, has constantly been reinterpreted 
                                                          
17
  Brownlie (2003) P. 287 
18
  Cassese (2005) p.48 
19
  Friendly Relations Declaration(1970) Sixth principle 
20
  Cassese (2005) p. 48 
21
  Kelsen (1944) P.208 
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in the decades since it was first enunciated.”22 He went on to say that “it has certainly not 
prevented the UN from discussing or adopting regulations relating to the internal policies of 
member states and the result of fifty years of practice has been the further restriction and 
erosion of domestic jurisdiction.”23 At the same time, Abiew suggested that the majority of 
states in the course of the United Nations debates support an absolute interpretation of the 
Charter’s prohibition of intervention.24 This view reflected in other international legal 
instruments, like the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, adopted by the 
UNGA in 1965 which reads in part: “No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state.”25 
 Similarly, general prohibitions of intervention have been reaffirmed in other fundamental 
Declaration of Principles of International Law in Accordance with the UN Charter, adopted 
by the UNGA in 1970. It recognised the 1965 Declaration and laid down wider non-
intervention principles. However, in spite of the general proscriptions of intervention in the 
General Assembly, there were little condemnations of humanitarian intervention in the UN 
debates.26 The principle of non-intervention is also reflected in many regional treaties, such 
as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union. 
 The principle of non-intervention was reaffirmed by the ICJ, in its 1986 judgement in the 
Nicaragua Case, as part of customary international law: 
 The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign state to 
conduct its affairs without interference; though examples of trespass against this principle 
are not infrequent, the court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international 
law [...] international law requires political integrity [...] to be respected.27  
In general, the principle is recognized by international law but what was once a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction may become issues subject to international inquiry and hence of 
international concern. This is the case with the international protection of human rights.28 In 
other words, the content of sovereignty has shifted regarding the concept of human rights. 
So, in case of flagrant and large-scale violation of human rights in a given state, the 
international community is entitled to forcefully intervene there.  
Shaw comments that acts constituting a violation of the customary principle of non-
intervention will also amounts to an infringement of the principle of the ‘non-use of force’ in 
                                                          
22
  Shaw (2003) P.575 
23
  Ibid 
24
  Abiew (1999) p.68 
25
  Res. 2131 (xx) 20 UN GAOR Supp. (No.14) cited in ibid, P.69 
26
  Abiew (1999) P.70 
27
  Nicaragua  V. USA 
28
  Abiew (1999) p.72 
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international relations, if involve directly or indirectly the use of force.29 Therefore, it is 
important to note this principle, especially, in the light of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
  
2.3 The prohibition of a threat or use of force in international law 
This section deals with the circumstances under which international law permits a state or 
an entity to use force against another states. While every state agrees that the use of force 
is generally impermissible, there is considerable disagreement over the precise 
circumstances in which it may lawfully be used. Humanitarian intervention is directly linked 
to the question of the use of force because restriction on the use of force in international 
relations has a crucial influence on the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 
Thus, understanding of the legal regulation of the use of force will create the necessary 
background for the discussion of the legality and legitimacy of intervention on humanitarian 
grounds. 
In the early days of international law, the use of force by states was regulated by the just 
war doctrine.30 In the fifth century, a moral ground for the regulation of the use of force was 
developed by St. Augustine through the doctrine of just war. This theory stipulates that war 
could be waged against a state that had caused injury under certain conditions.31 In short, 
war was illegal unless undertaken for a just cause. Just cause encompassed a variety of 
situations, but mainly involved the punishment of the wrongdoers.32  
But by the nineteenth century, war had come to be viewed as a legitimate instrument of 
foreign policy and resort to war was an attribute of statehood.33 During this period, the 
governing doctrine was the sovereign right to resort to war, so that every state had a 
perfect legal right to resort to war for any reason. Hence, the concept of the just war 
disappeared from international law.34 The sovereign right to resort to war governed 
international relations until the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919. 
 The Covenant of the League of Nations introduced a limited restriction on the sovereign 
right to resort to war. The covenant established procedural mechanisms to encourage states 
to cool off before commencing hostilities. The members of the league agreed that if there 
should be arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the 
matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the council, and they agreed in no case to resort 
to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the council.35 
But once the procedural safeguards laid down in Articles 10 to 16 of the Covenant were 
                                                          
29
  Shaw (1999) P.1039 
30
  Dixon (2005) P.290 
31
  McCaffrey (2006) P.234 
32
  Shaw (2003) P.1014 
33
  Brownlie (2003) P. 697 
34
  Shaw (2003) P.1015 
35
  League of Nations’ Covenant Art 12 
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exhausted, a state could resort to war. So the Covenant was not effective in prohibiting 
violence to any great degree. 
In 1928 the Covenant was supplemented by the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 
signed on 27 August 1928, commonly called the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This treaty represented 
the first attempt to outlaw war completely,36 by which the parties “condemn recourse to 
war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of 
foreign policy in their relationship with one another.”37 This was the vital development. 
However, one writer commented that: “since the prohibition applied to ‘war’ (and not 
‘force’), the pact was as flawed as the Covenant.”38 On the other hand, it has been 
suggested that “the pact laid the groundwork for the regime of the United Nations Charter 
concerning the use of force, and was ‘the foundation of state practice in the period 1928 to 
1945’ relating to the use of force.”39 Indeed, today the pact, which in force at present40, 
stands together with the UN charter as one of the two major sources of the norm limiting 
resort to force by states.41 
 The prohibition of the threat or use of force was first laid down in the UN charter. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter provides as follows: 
 All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.42  
This provision not only restrains the use of force itself but it also extends to the threat of 
force. This approach obviously represents departure from the pre-Kellogg-Briand pact 
regime, in which the emphasis was not on prohibiting force but the waging of war.43  
There is no doubt that all states recognize and accept the fundamental importance of the 
primary ban on resort to force. However, there is no unanimity among legal scholars and 
states on the actual content and scope of Article 2(4). There are two opposing views that 
interpret this provision in different ways. 
 The first is permissive school. It takes the general view that the Charter did not 
fundamentally change the direction of international law and, therefore, that reference may 
be had to pre-1945 rules in determining the ambit of the primary prohibition of force.44  
Permissive school further argue that Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force ‘against the 
                                                          
36
  Dixon (2005) p.291 
37
  Kellog-Briand pact art I 
38
  Dixon (2005) p.291 
39
  McCaffrey (2006) P.235 
40
  Ibid, p.234 
41
  Brownlie (1963) P.91 
42
  UN Charter art 2(4) 
43
  McCaffrey (2006) P.236 
44
  Dixon (2005) p.292 
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territorial integrity or political independence’ of any state or ‘in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes’ of the UN. So, according to this permissive view, if the use of 
force does not result in the loss or permanent occupation of territory; if it does not 
compromise the target state’s ability to take independent decisions; and if it is not contrary 
to UN purposes, it is not unlawful.45 
The second approach is the restrictive school. It takes the view that the Charter brought 
about a radical change in states’ right, so that Article 2(4) lays down a total and uniform ban 
on Non-defensive unilateral use of force. And that a right of unilateral resort to force exists 
only if the Charter explicitly grants such a right.46These are those provisions of Article 51 and 
Article 107 of the Charter, which are the right of self-defence and action against ex-enemy 
states respectively. But the later is now obsolete in that those ex-enemy states became 
members of the UN.  
This clash of ideas on the scope of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a matter of judgement 
and interpretation. Today the interpretation of treaty provisions is governed by the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in particular Articles 31-33. According to this 
convention, methods of treaty interpretation can be summarised as follows: interpretation 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of treaty in their context and in light 
of its object and purposes47; interpretation in light of subsequent agreements between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or application of its provision, together 
with the subsequent practice48; and interpretation of the text by having recourse to the 
preparatory work of  the treaty and circumstances of its conclusion.49 
The principal method of treaty interpretation is interpretation in accordance with its object 
and purpose. The primary purpose of the United Nations and the Charter is to maintain 
international peace and security, and in pursuit of this purpose, the member states have 
undertaken to settle their international disputes by peaceful means.50The Charter was born 
of Second World War that produced unprecedented damage and suffering, and its purpose 
was to save succeeding generation from the scourge of war51, to that end armed force shall 
not be used except in the common interest.52 
Thus, in my opinion, in light of the general purposes of the Charter, Article 2(4) is not to be 
interpreted in the way claimed by the permissive school. The prohibition of unilateral use of 
force by states under this provision is the general rule and the right of self-defence under 
Article 51of the Charter is an exception to this general rule. Therefore, the restrictive view 
                                                          
45
  Ibid, p.293 
46
  Ibid 
47
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31(1) 
48
  Ibid, Article 31(3)(a)(b) 
49
  Ibid, art 32 
50
  UN Charter arts 1 and 2(3) 
51
  Ibid, preamble Para.1 
52
  Ibid, preamble para.7 
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of the use of force, i.e., broad interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, seems tenable 
and plausible. According to Brownlie, this view is also supported by the historic context in 
which the Charter was drafted, which is one of the methods of treaty interpretation, albeit 
considered as a supplementary means.53 
The prohibition of a threat or use of force in international relations also reflected in 
subsequent practice and resolutions of the UNGA, including the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty (G.A. Resolution 2131(xx) adopted in December 1965); the 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opration 
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN (G.A. Resolution 2625(xxv) adopted 
in October 1970); and the Definition of Aggression (G.A. Resolution 3314(xxix) adopted in 
December 1974). 
These Declarations are not ordinary conventions and hence do not create obligations 
binding on states. Nevertheless, Brownlie argued that even if these instruments cannot have 
a legislative effect, they are part of the subsequent practice of the member states of the UN 
and must be given appropriate weight for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of the 
Charter.54 
In addition to the UN Charter, the general ban on the use of force exists also in 
corresponding customary law. Even In Nicaragua Case, when examining the specific 
proscription of the use of force as contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the ICJ held 
that this rule is not only a principle of customary International law, but constitutes a Jus 
Cogens norm.55 Jus Cogens norm56, otherwise known as peremptory norms of international 
community, is founded in customary international law and is so fundamental it binds all 
states. No states can derogate from this norm either by treaties or customary rule, and it 
can only be modified by a subsequent norm of international law with the same character. 
2.4 The exceptions to the general prohibition on a threat or use of force 
The ban on the use of force has three exceptions in the UN Charter. The first exception is 
enforcement measures undertaken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The second exception is force which may be used in individual or collective self-defence 
under Article 51 of the Charter, and the last exception is the now obsolete article 107 
provision for action against ex-enemy states. The first exception will be examined below in 
this section. The last two exceptions will not be considered further in this paper. 
2.4.1 Action under the authority of the UN Security 
Council 
                                                          
53
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 32 
54
  In Cassese,The current regulation of the use of force (1986) p.492 
55
  Nicaragua v. USA  
56
  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts 53 and 64 
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The primary purpose of the United Nations was to maintain international peace and 
security. Under Article 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has a primary 
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security, and in carrying out its 
duty under this responsibility, the Council acts on behalf of member states. Chapter VII of 
the Charter (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of 
aggression) gives very wide power to the SC, and sets out the framework for its 
enforcement powers. As mentioned above, under Article 2(7) of the Charter these powers 
are not limited by the normal duty on the UN not to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of 
member states. In accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter, the decision of the SC has 
the binding effect upon the member states of the UN. 
 Here again, under Article 103 of the UN Charter, the obligations undertaken by member 
states under the Charter prevails, in case of conflict, over their obligations under any other 
agreements. Indeed, the Council is empowered to use force for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security as part of its collective security function.  
Brownlie comments that the design of the UN constitutes a comprehensive public order, 
and the assumption is that the organization, and in particular the SC has a monopoly of the 
use of force57 except in cases of self-defence. Article 42 of the UN Charter provides as 
follows: 
 Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [i.e. 
measures not involving the use of armed force] would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.  
This provision is premised on the existence of forces contributed to the SC by member 
states as envisaged in article 43 of the UN Charter, and a Military Staff Committee under 
Article 47 to advise and assist the SC. However, this was not how the system had worked in 
practice and this original Charter scheme is not fully realised.58The practice under the 
Charter has led the Security Council to authorize states to use force on behalf of the 
international community rather than using force itself.59This is attributable to the 
ideological confrontation between the two-blocks during the Cold War which prevented the 
political agreement enshrined in Article 43 of the UN Charter to set up the UN military 
forces.60 
It should be made clear here that the requirements of Article 39 of the Charter have to be 
fulfilled to invoke the use of force and the SC has to decide the measures it will take in order 
to restore international peace and security. Under this article, if the SC determines that 
                                                          
57
  Brownlie (2003) p.706 
58
  Dixon (2005) p.309 
59
  McCaffrey (2006) P.247 
60
  Cassese (2005) p.339 
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there is ‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression’, it may take 
such measures as are necessary to restore international peace, including the armed force 
under Article 42 of the Charter. Thus, it is of considerable importance to know what types of 
conduct may fall within Article 39 for this is the precondition to exercise these enforcement 
powers. 
 Clearly, armed military actions are encompassed by Article 39, but ‘threats to the peace’ 
are not limited to military situations or international conflicts. Indeed, the Security Council 
has gradually established a direct link between Humanitarian crises and a threat to the 
peace and authorised member states to use force. For instance, UNSC by Resolution 794 
(1992), adopted unanimously on 3 December 1992 on Somalia, determined that “the 
magnitude of human tragedy caused the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the 
obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance” constituted a threat 
to international peace and security and authorised Secretary-General and member states to 
use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia.61 Of course, “all necessary means” includes the use of force. Other 
examples are UNSC Resolutions 770 and 816 (1993) on the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Resolution 929 (1994) on Rwanda. 
 Thus, the SC has significantly enlarged the concept of ‘threat to the peace’ laid down in 
Article 39 of the charter so as to embrace humanitarian crises within one state and internal 
conflicts, which previously subject to national jurisdiction. In fact, it is the discretion of the 
Council to define which conducts constitute threat to peace under Article 39.  
Indeed, the UNSC has been able to authorise member states to use force on humanitarian 
grounds against a state as a means of restoring international peace and security. In this 
regard, Resolution 794(1992) on Somalia, resolution 770 and 816(1993) on Bosnia and 
Resolution 929(1994) on Rwanda can be cited as an example. 
In sum, the UNSC is empowered to use, or authorise the use, of force when there exists a 
threat to international peace.  As the practice of the SC shows, humanitarian crisis in 
internal conflicts, among others qualified as ‘a threat to international peace and security’ 
and the Council authorised member states to halt human rights violation in a given country. 
2.5 Sovereignty in relation to respect for human rights 
The fundamental rule of international law prescribes that states are duty bound not to 
affect the preserve of other states’ internal affairs as a result of the sovereign equality of 
states. As noted earlier, this rule is envisaged in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. However, it 
has been reinterpreted in the human rights field. In the 19th century, the positivist doctrines 
of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction prevailed in state practice. Shaw commented 
that during this period all matters that at present would be regarded as human rights issues 
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were generally considered as a preserve of domestic jurisdiction.62This rule has been 
reinterpreted in the human rights field so that states may no longer plead it as a bar to 
international concern and consideration of internal human rights situations.63 
Like the rules on the use of force, the principle imposing respect for human rights is typical 
of a new stage of development in the international community following WWII while 
respect for state sovereignty is the old one.64Both were integrated with the adoption of the 
UN Charter. But their coexistence has not been easy: the two principles more often 
confronted than partnered.65Nevertheless, modern concept of sovereignty that involves a 
duty to protect human rights is widely reinforced today. Cassese commented that the 
adoption of the UN Charter and the subsequent enactment of such fundamental 
instruments as the 1948 Universal Declaration and the 1966 two Covenants on Human 
Rights had such an influence on the world society that no state today challenges the 
principle that human rights have to be respected by all states.66He further pointed out that: 
 States have gradually come to accept the idea that massive infringements of basic 
human rights are reprehensible; they make the delinquent state accountable to the whole 
international community.67 (Emphasis added). 
The UN Charter provided initial principles for the protection of human rights. The preamble 
of the Charter declares the determination of the peoples of the world “... reaffirming faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person, in equal rights of men 
and women...” One of the basic purposes of the UN Charter, as stated in Article 1(3), is 
“promoting and encouraging respect for human rights.” In accordance with Article 55, the 
members of the UN reaffirm a commitment to promoting universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of any 
kind. And under Article 56, all members of the UN “pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55.” It has been suggested that the term ‘pledge’ in Article 56 had the 
consequence of converting the purposes listed in article 55 into binding obligations.68 
Hence, it would seem that the Charter provisions regarding human rights represent binding 
legal obligations for member states. So, gross violations of basic human rights make the 
delinquent state accountable to the international community. Thus, intervention on 
humanitarian grounds is Permissible. Abiew concluded that: 
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 The cumulative effect of these provisions is that intervention to prevent human rights 
abuses is still valid. While it may be doubtful whether states can be called to account for 
every  alleged violation of the general Charter provisions, there is little doubt that 
responsibility  exists under the Charter for any substantial infringement of the provisions, 
especially when a class of persons or a pattern of activity are involved.69 (Emphasis added). 
The cornerstone of the UN activity has been obviously the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The preamble of this Declaration emphasises that “recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”70It has been suggested that during 
WWII, one of the aims of the allied powers was the realization that international protection 
of human rights as the only means to achieve international peace and progress.71The 
Universal declaration proclaims the complete range of civil and political rights and 
economic, social and cultural rights. It is generally agreed that, currently the Universal 
Declaration, particularly many of its provisions have gained formal legal force by coming a 
part of customary international law. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the optional protocol on 
communication or petition was adopted in 1966 by the UNGA and entered into force in 
1976. This Covenant defines and sets out, in much greater detail than the Universal 
Declaration, a variety of rights and freedoms. It imposes an absolute and immediate 
obligation on each of the states parties to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the [...] covenant without 
distinction of any kind [...]”72. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR) was adopted by 
the UNGA in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. It elaborates upon most of the economic, 
social and cultural rights provided for under the 1948 Universal Declaration and frequently 
sets out measures that should be undertaken to achieve their realization.73  
In short, these two Covenants, together with the Universal Declaration, constitute the 
“International Bill of Human Rights”.74  
Apart from these instruments, there are also a host of treaties and declarations adopted by 
the UNGA explaining specific obligations pertaining to particular human rights which 
include, inter alia, the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide; the 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
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Discrimination; and the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
There are also regional human rights systems which include: The European Convention on 
Human Rights which signed in 1950 and entered into force in 1953; The American 
Convention on Human Rights which signed in 1969 and entered into force in 1978; and The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which signed in 1981 and entered into force 
in 1986.  
Regarding the customary nature of human rights, Shaw stated that besides international 
and regional human rights instruments, certain human rights may be considered to having 
gained the status of customary international law.75Even in contemporary international law, 
some fundamental human rights are recognized as part of rules of obligation Erga Omnes. In 
1970, in the Barcelona Traction Case, the ICJ defined the meaning of erga omnes obligation 
and gave examples of such erga omnes rules which are vital for international human rights 
law. The relevant part of that opinion of the ICJ reads as follows: 
 An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a state towards 
the international community as a whole, and those arising Vis-a-Vis another state in the field 
of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all sates. In view 
of the importance of the rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in 
contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide 
as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination...76 (Emphasis added). 
In this case the definition of erga omnes given by the ICJ has become the well-known and 
most authoritative definition of erga omnes rules77. It should be noted here that the list 
provided by the ICJ in this case is not exhaustive but rather illustrative. This is apparent from 
the phrase “for example”. So, proscriptions of gross violations of fundamental human rights, 
including but not limited to genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, are obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole and obligations which every state has a legal 
interest in having respected. 
 In accordance with the 2001 International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally wrongful Acts, any state other than an injured state is entitled to 
invoke the responsibility of another state (presumably delinquent state) if the obligation 
breached is owed to the international community as a whole.78Thus, any state is entitled to 
claim from the responsible state the “cessation of the international wrongful act, and 
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assurances and guarantees of non-repetition”79This is true for flagrant and large-scale 
violations of fundamental human rights. 
 Hence, delinquent state may no longer plead the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention as a bar to intervention by the international community to protect those rights 
since they are not considered today as ‘a matter exclusively within domestic jurisdiction’ but 
rather the concern of international community as a whole. Cassese suggested that, in 
different occasions the UN refused to accept the objection of state sovereignty invoked by a 
number of states, and considered different issues regarding human rights.80 The UN justified 
its intervention by linking human rights violations to a threat to international peace. 
The concern for human rights gradually inspired and shaped the decision of the UNSC which 
is the highest international authority empowered to define conducts which constitute 
‘threats to peace’ and adopt enforcement measures, including the use of armed force81. 
Popovski suggested that: “in a major development of its powers from defending state 
sovereignty to defending human rights, the Council [UNSC] condemned and imposed 
sanctions against the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa.”82However, the Council 
paralyzed by the veto in most cases, especially during the Cold War era and as a result, 
murderous regimes in some countries enjoyed impunity.83Nevertheless, with the end of the 
Cold War, the role of the UNSC has been revived. This is because most cases of serious 
human rights violations, like in Somalia84, Bosnia85 and Rwanda86 have been qualified by the 
UNSC as threats to peace and authorised interventions to end such violations. 
 Cassese concluded that, because of the growing international conventions and the 
foundation of the monitoring mechanisms on human rights, UN members believed that 
intervention was permitted, if a state engages in flagrant and gross violations of its citizens’ 
fundamental rights, irrespective of whether such violations constitute a threat to peace.87 
Thus, humanitarian intervention is justified in international law at least in the case of 
widespread and systematic violations of human rights, if not in isolated cases. 
In sum, the two major values, respect for state sovereignty, an old one, and respect for 
human rights, a more recent one, were integrated in international law. But their coexistence 
has been difficult. The principle of state sovereignty has been regarded as overwhelming 
and unconditional in international law since the peace of Westphalia. However, it has been 
redefined in the human rights field, which no longer antagonizes but rather incorporates the 
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concept of human rights. In other words, the redefinition of sovereignty to include a duty to 
protect and respect human rights is recognized in contemporary international law. State 
sovereignty remains the basic norm of international law, but a state cannot pretend 
absolute sovereignty without demonstrating a duty to protect human rights. International 
law becomes more permissive regarding cross-border intervention to protect human rights.  
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3 Humanitarian intervention 
 
3.1 Definition of humanitarian intervention 
There is no generally accepted definition of humanitarian intervention. Chesterman 
suggested that “the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ only emerged in the nineteenth 
century as a possible exception to [...] rule of non-intervention, but its meaning was far from 
clear: some writers held it to be a legal right; others confidently rejected it; a third group 
held that international law could or should have little to say about the matter.” He added 
that “Neither the writings of publicists nor state practice establishes any coherent meaning 
of this ‘right’...”88Since the issue of humanitarian intervention is related to international law, 
political science, morality and international relations, one may come across different 
definitions and categorisations. 
Although there is no generally agreed definition of humanitarian intervention, some 
scholars defined the concept in a similar ways. Teson defines it as the “proportionate help, 
including forcible help, provided by governments (individually or in alliances) to individuals 
in another state who are victims of severe tyranny (denial of human rights by their own 
government) or anarchy (denial of human rights by collapse of the social order.)”89 For J.L. 
Holzgrefe, humanitarian intervention is “the threat or use of force across state borders by a 
state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission 
of the state within whose territory force is applied.”90Again, according to Kardas, 
humanitarian intervention is “forcible action by states to prevent or to end gross violations 
of human rights on behalf of people other than their own nationals, through the use of 
armed force without the consent of the target government and with or without UN 
authorisation.”91 
These definitions do overlap in important aspects. Some common points exist between 
them which include: first the use of military force. Although some scholars tend to add non-
forcible measures in its definition, the majority exclude them. The second common point is 
the absence of the consent of the target state. This is the main point which makes it a 
humanitarian intervention and distinguishes it from both peacekeeping and humanitarian 
assistance. The third common point is the aim of the intervention, i.e. to protect non-
nationals. Intervention to protect a state’s own nationals abroad is a category of self-
defence. Hence, the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ is reserved to those cases that 
intended to protect non-nationals. 
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 The widespread and systematic infringement of basic human rights of such non-nationals 
must also taking place. The question of which rights are involved is subject to differing 
interpretations. Nevertheless, although it is difficult to give a comprehensive list of rights 
that can be involved, in the first place it concerns the right to life. Also it includes the rights 
and freedoms the violation of which effect the right to life. It is also meaningful in the sense 
that such an intervention is generally carried out in cases of gross violations caused by the 
target state itself or the state’s collapse. However, the party responsible for such violation is 
not necessarily a state. It may also be an organized group having de facto authority over 
certain territory. There is a growing consensus on basic criteria and the threshold for 
intervention. These may include such serious human rights violations as genocide, crimes 
against humanity and other serious infringement of international humanitarian law.92These 
crimes are recognized also as the most serious crimes of concern to the world community as 
a whole.93 
The last point relates to the agency of intervention. Although some confine the term to 
interventions by states, there is a recent practice to include interventions by international 
organizations, such as the UN and regional arrangements like the NATO.   
In general, humanitarian intervention is forcible action performed, and aimed at compelling 
a sovereign to respect fundamental human rights of its citizens in the exercise of its 
sovereign power.  
3.2 Humanitarian intervention v. responsibility to protect  
Although usually considered to be categorically distinct from most definitions of 
humanitarian intervention94,the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” deserve mention. 
The concept of the responsibility to protect, also called R2P, was developed in response to 
the genocide in Rwanda and the deliberate targeting of civilians in Kosovo and Srebrenica. 
Since these crises, a series of governmental and non-governmental initiatives have focused 
on reconciling the traditional notion of state sovereignty with respect for human rights, with 
the moral imperative to act with force if necessary in the face of core international crimes.  
In 2000, Canada launched the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) with a mandate to tackle this issue, and has developed its remarkable 
report, entitled “the responsibility to protect”, as a vital framework to reach international 
consensus around the legitimate use of force to halt serious crimes. The report sought to 
establish a set of clear guidelines for determining when intervention is appropriate, what 
the appropriate channels for approving an intervention are and how the intervention itself 
should be performed. 
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The R2P refers to the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, 
that responsibility must be borne by international community as a whole: it is a principle 
based on the idea that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility.95The R2P focuses 
on preventing and halting four crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing, which it places under the generic umbrella term of “mass 
atrocity crimes.” 
 The R2P is said to involve three stages. The first is responsibility to prevent: to address both 
the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting 
populations at risk.96 The second is responsibility to react: to respond to situations of 
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures 
like sanctions and international prosecutions, and in extreme cases military 
intervention.97The third stage is responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a 
military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, 
addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.98 
According to the 2001 ICISS report, prevention is the single most important dimension of 
the R2P. Prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is carried out, 
and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it. According to this report, the 
exercise of the responsibility both to prevent and to react should always involve less 
intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones 
are applied.99 
Regarding legitimacy, the ICISS identified five criteria that should be applied by the UNSC to 
test the validity of any form of military intervention initiated under the premise of R2P. 
These five criteria are: 
1 Just cause: Is there serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or 
imminently to occur, like large-scale loss of life, large-scale ethnic cleansing100; 
2 Right intention: Is the primary purpose of the proposed military action to halt or 
avert human suffering, whatever other motives may be in play101; 
3 Last resort: Has every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution 
of the crisis been explored, and are there reasonable grounds for believing lesser 
measures will not succeed102; 
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4 Proportional means: is the scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military 
action the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective103; 
and 
5 Reasonable prospects: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being 
successful in meeting the threat in question, and are the consequences of action not 
likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.104 
Evans noted that all the above five criteria were also requirements not only in Christian just 
war doctrine but in other major world religions and intellectual traditions as well.105 
As to the R2P in the UN, at the 2005 World Summit, member states included R2P in the 
Outcome Document agreeing to paragraphs 138 and 139, which gave final language to the 
scope of R2P, as applies to the four atrocity crimes only. The outcome document represents 
the first global consensus on the responsibility of individual states and of the world 
community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing. It affirms the international community’s willingness to take timely and 
decisive action, through the UNSC, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from such crimes.106 
The World Summit consensus on the R2P was further endorsed by the UNSC in 2006 in its 
resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, thereby formalizing its support 
for the principle.107However, it was still unresolved whether states could intervene 
unilaterally for humanitarian purpose if the UN was deadlocked.  
Here, it is important to note the distinction between the principle of humanitarian 
intervention and the R2P just to clarify and delimit the terms properly. Here, the question 
arises whether the two concepts are the same or different? 
There are a number of differences between the two concepts. In the first place, the principal 
element in the definition of humanitarian intervention is the use of military force while R2P 
offers a broader set of tools with which to prevent and halt mass atrocity crimes. As noted 
earlier, although some writers tend to include non-forcible actions in the definition of 
humanitarian intervention, the majority exclude them. Under R2P, the use of military force 
is the last of many options. In other words, unlike humanitarian intervention, the R2P 
advocates a greater reliance on non-military measures. Secondly, even when it comes to 
military intervention, there are still differences between the two concepts: intervention 
under R2P is confined to preventing and halting only four crimes, namely genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing whereas humanitarian intervention 
can be applied to situations beyond these crimes. Third, intervention under R2P is generally 
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carried out multilaterally only with the approval of the UNSC while humanitarian 
intervention can be implemented unilaterally without a mandate of UNSC.  
The 2001 report of the ICISS also attempts to change the terminology surrounding the issue 
of humanitarian intervention. According to Evans Gareth, the chairman of the ICISS, one of 
the main contributions of the report to the international policy debate was that it invents a 
new way of talking about humanitarian intervention.108He explained that the commission 
sought to turn the whole debate about the right to intervene on its head and to re-
characterize it not as an argument about any ‘right’ at all but rather about a 
‘responsibility’.109Hence, according to the ICISS, under the R2P rather than having a right to 
intervene in the conduct of other states, states are said to have a responsibility to intervene 
and protect the citizens of another state where that other state has failed in its primary 
obligation to protect its own citizens. 
3.3 Historical evolution of the principle of humanitarian intervention 
Humanitarian intervention has long been a routine feature of the international system. The 
genesis of the principle dated back to ancient time. According to Abiew, one of the earliest 
known instance occurred in 480 BC where the prince of Syracuse, in defeating the 
Carthaginians, laid down as one of the conditions of peace that they refrain from the 
barbarous custom of sacrificing their children to Saturn. Intervention was also common in 
the Greek City-State system and the Roman Empire.110  
The early discussions of the concept of humanitarian intervention traced back to 16th and 
17th Century classical writers on international law, like Grotius and Vattel, particularly in 
their discussion on just war theory. Here again, the classical formulation of the right of 
humanitarian intervention was inspired by natural law ideas and the doctrine of just war. 
Grotius regarded maltreatment by a sovereign of his subjects a just cause to wage war on 
their behalf. He stated that “if a sovereign, although exercising his rights, acts contrary to 
the rights of humanity by grievously ill-treating his own subjects, the right of intervention 
may be lawfully exercised.”111The Grotian formulation allows the full-scale use of force to 
end human suffering.  
Vattel recognized the right to intervene against a government at the request of the 
oppressed people. He stated that “if the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his 
people a legitimate reason to resist him, if tyranny becomes so unbearable as to cause the 
Nation to rise, any foreign power is entitled to help an oppressed people that has requested 
assistance.”112 
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From the time of the reformation, European powers often used force or diplomatic pressure 
against each other to protect religious minorities from persecution. Knudsen noted that the 
greater part of the history of humanitarian intervention is the history of intervention to 
protect persecuted religious minorities.113 
During the 18th and 19th Centuries, Philosophers of political liberalism tended to link the 
concept of humanitarian intervention to the concept of human rights.114 Towards the end of 
18th Century, some scholars began to treat it as an exception to the general principle of non-
intervention, which they place as one of the pillars of international law in their new 
positivist theory. In the years 1770-80, Johan Jakob referred to the right to intervene when 
necessary to protect individuals from religious persecution. He emphasized that the motive 
should be humanitarian and not religious, and that this should be seen as an exception to 
the principle of non-intervention.115  
Most observers of international law held the belief that world society as a whole recognized 
the existence of some minimum standards of humanity which could justify departure from 
the general rule of non-intervention.116 
The modern concept of humanitarian intervention is generally associated with state practice 
in the 19th Century, when states started to invoke humanitarian sentiments to justify their 
interventions. In the 19th Century, humanitarian intervention became a standard subject of 
discussion in the works published on international law, as a result of the increasing and 
more dramatic use of that right in state practice.117According to Brownlie, by the end of 19th 
century the majority of scholars agreed that a right of humanitarian intervention 
existed.118The well-cited cases were generally directed against Ottoman Empire for the 
protection of Christians, like the Greek and Lebanon-Syria. However, legal positivist writers 
of the 19th Century acknowledged the right or practice of humanitarian intervention on 
moral and humanitarian grounds alone. Nevertheless, other writers recognised the 
existence of the legal right of humanitarian intervention.119 
In the first half of 20th Century, the conception of the right of humanitarian intervention 
continued to attract the support of out-standing scholars of international law. For instance, 
Lassa Oppenheim maintained that “should a state venture to treat its own subjects or part 
thereof with such cruelty as would stagger humanity, public opinion of the rest of the world 
would call upon the powers to exercise intervention.”120Similarly, Lauterpacht stated that 
“the exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops where outrage upon humanity 
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begins”121According to Knudsen, Lauterpacht was one of the leading international lawyers, 
who also advocated the right of humanitarian intervention as being part of international law 
even at a time where it had disappeared from state practice.122Indeed, the right of 
humanitarian intervention had a solid basis in state practice before WWI. The absence of 
prohibitions of use of force in international relations was a reason to explain the existence 
of this practice. 
After WWII, the UN Charter introduced a new rule imposing limits upon the use of force in 
international relations. It left the “threat to international peace and security” as the only 
possible justification for intervention in the domestic affairs of states, and all acts of 
intervention were subjected to authorisation by UNSC as part of its collective security 
function. Since 1945, the UNSC has authorised the use of force to end human rights 
violations. However, practice in the Cold War period shows that SC was hardly able to 
implement the provisions of the Charter on collective security due to ideological 
confrontation between the two superpowers and the emergence of third world states with 
their valuation of sovereignty. As a result, the issue of intervention became perceived as 
forcible self-help by states to uphold human rights in other states.123 There were some 
unilateral interventions which frequently cited in the literature as recent examples of 
humanitarian intervention, such as Indian intervention in East Pakistan, Tanzanian 
intervention in Uganda and Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea. 
 
Brief enquire of the period indicates that state practice throughout the Cold War did not 
establish the doctrine in customary international law. The Cold War made non-intervention 
a universal norm while the right of humanitarian intervention remained an exception.124  
With the end of the Cold War, human rights norms developed significantly and received 
general support. The end of this war brought about revolutionary change in the concept and 
practice of humanitarian intervention. The UNSC get the chance to take and authorise 
measures under provisions of chapter VII of the Charter against aggressor states as well as 
regimes allegedly violated human rights of their citizens.125 Kardas pointed out that: 
“Humanitarian interventions [after the end of the Cold War] are not only responses to the 
suffering caused by repressive governments, but also they are directed to situations 
produced by internal conflicts, state disintegration and state collapses, as a result of which 
human rights are grossly violated.”126In the Post Cold War era, the majority of armed 
conflicts were internal in character and this has resulted in the growing number of UNSC 
resolutions whereby gross violations of human rights qualified as ‘a threat to international 
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peace and security’. In some cases, the SC decided to impose economic sanctions.  In others, 
it authorised to use armed force. In this regard, cases of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, can 
be cited as an examples. In the Post -Cold War era, some interventions of humanitarian 
character were also implemented without the explicit authorisation by the UNSC, such as 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1998-9. 
3.4 State practice on humanitarian intervention 
This section reviews cases of actual interventions on humanitarian grounds that occurred in 
the pre-Charter, during Cold War and Post- Cold War periods. It confines to discuss only 
those interventions undertaken on humanitarian grounds and to examine whether such 
interventions as state practice contributed for the formation of customary norm. It will not 
raise the issues of the legality and legitimacy of such interventions, which will be examined 
later under the next chapter. 
3.4.1 The practice in the pre-Charter period 
State practice on humanitarian intervention dated back to ancient times. However, most of 
the examples of state practice that can be offered from the time before the establishment 
of the European Concert are cases of diplomatic interference and attempted dictate on 
humanitarian grounds. So it is difficult to find clear example of humanitarian intervention in 
the 17th and 18th centuries.127Thus, it is in the 19th and early 20th centuries that the 
institution of humanitarian intervention gained ground in state practice. Knudsen noted that 
“As a consequence of the establishment of the European Concert in 1815, the occasional 
resort to diplomatic interference and attempted dictate in the 18th Century gave way to a 
practice of outright humanitarian intervention.”128 
The earliest instance of a genuine humanitarian intervention, frequently cited in the 
literature, is the 1827 joint intervention of Great Britain, France and Russia to stop the 
Turkish massacres against Greek population.129The majority of scholars have accepted this 
intervention as based on humanitarian considerations.130 
Another instance of humanitarian intervention is the 1860-61 French intervention in Syria. 
From 16th Century until the WWI, Syria was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Turkish rule led to the massacre of thousands of Christians by the Muslim population. The 
French intervention was authorised and supervised by the five European great powers to 
stop the massacres of the Maronite Christian committed by the Muslim Druses under 
Turkish supremacy. The French force withdrew in 1861 after accomplished their 
tasks.131According to Chesterman the most important element of this incident as an 
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instance of humanitarian intervention is the relative disinterestedness of the acting parties, 
and the humanitarian concerns of the five European powers appear to have been 
genuine.132 
The US intervention in Cuba in 1898 can also be cited as instance of humanitarian 
intervention. Some writers noted that US intervention in Cuba is an example of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention in pre-Charter state practice.133The intervention was on the basis 
of reports of atrocities committed by Spanish military authorities attempting to suppress 
Cuban rebellions. Although other motives may have prompted the US action, the evidence 
points also to the presence of humanitarian sentiments, and thus fall within the ambit of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Regarding the practice of humanitarian intervention in the Pre-Charter period, Teson argued 
that an important precedent for a right of humanitarian intervention is the WWII itself. He 
concluded that “the allies fought Fascism not just because Hitler and Mussolini engaged in 
military aggression, but to defend ‘dignity, reason, human rights and decency against 
degradation, authoritarianism, irrationality, and obscurantism’”.134 
In addition to examples given above, the doctrine has been relevant on a number of 
occasions in the Pre-Charter period, although less clear than the instances discussed above. 
In most cases, several of the major powers acted multilaterally under the auspices of the 
Concert of Europe typically against the Ottoman Empire. In short, during the 19th and early 
20th centuries, in cases of intervention states invoked humanitarian sentiments. This clearly 
constitutes state practice sufficient to recognize the right of humanitarian intervention.  
3.4.2 The practice during the Cold War era 
After the establishment of the United Nations, in particular during the Cold War, some 
interventions were undertaken by states without authorisation of UNSC and frequently 
cited in the literature as recent instances of humanitarian intervention.  
In 1971, Western Pakistan’s military forces launched an operation against the struggle of 
Eastern Pakistan for independence, as a consequence of which around one million persons 
were killed and more than ten million refugees fled to India. This led to Indian intervention 
in East Pakistan in November 1971 which resulted in the establishment of new country 
Bangladesh. Regarding the motives of the intervention, although India initially asserted 
humanitarian motives, it ultimately relied on the traditional ground of self-defence.135In fact 
India addressed the problem of ten million refugees and atrocities committed by Pakistani 
troops. Some writers claimed that India’s intervention in East Pakistan is to be generally one 
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of the better instances of humanitarian intervention.136India’s action constitutes state 
practice for the purposes of customary international law formation but there is little 
evidence of opinio juris.137  
Another intervention during this period is the 1978-9 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda. The 
cruelty of Amin’s regime in Uganda was notorious. The dictatorial regime of Idi Amin 
resulted in the deaths of several thousands of innocent people. In November 1978, Ugandan 
troops occupied Kagera Salient region of Tanzania. In response to this, Tanzanian military 
forces attacked Uganda’s armed forces in the said region. By January 1979, Tanzanian forces 
penetrated into the territory of Uganda with the support of Uganda’s anti-governmental 
National Liberation Front. In April 1979, Tanzanian military forces controlled the Ugandan 
capital which ended with the overthrown of Amin’s regime who fled the country. 
 The result of Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda is widely advocated as a desirable result 
and mostly considered as a victory for human rights.138According to Teson, humanitarian 
considerations were prominent in this intervention and in general Tanzanian action was 
legitimized by the international community.139 He concluded that it was a genuine instance 
of humanitarian intervention.140On the other hand, it has been suggested that Tanzania’s 
actions typically equivocate between its humanitarian motives and the motive of self-
defence.141In terms of state practice, Chesterman suggested that it can be said with 
confidence only that “the action was not condemned” and he concluded that “there is little 
evidence of opinio juris beyond an affirmation of the right of self-defence.”142 
The 1978-9 Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea (Cambodia) was also the one that is 
commonly regarded as instance of humanitarian intervention in the literature. In 1975, Pol 
Pot overthrew General Lon Nol and came into power. Oppression of the people began 
immediately in which more than two million people were reported dead. The victims of this 
repression include the ethnic Vietnamese. Following the fighting along the Vietnamese-
Kampuchean border throughout 1978, Vietnamese military forces invaded Kampuchea in 
December 1978. In February 1979, the Vietnamese military forces involved members of the 
United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea, an insurgent group formed earlier by 
exiled Kampucheans, established control over most of the territory of Kampuchea. Pol Pot 
fled to the mountains and the new government supported by Vietnam was established. 
Vietnam claimed, in its official position in the UN debate, that it used force after 
Kampuchean aggression in self-defence and that it undertook military action against 
inhuman conditions which Pol Pot’s regime committed against its subjects. Humanitarian 
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concerns were also discussed in the SC debate.143Chesterman stated that like Tanzania’s 
intervention in Uganda, Vietnamese concern with Kampuchea was only partly humanitarian 
in origin.144In general, Abiew comments that: 
 The failure of the international community, including the UN, to find a diplomatic 
solution or to take any concrete measures of response, left the Vietnamese course of action 
as the viable  option and the immediate solution to end the atrocities that were being 
committed.145 (Emphasis added). 
As example of state practice, Chesterman noted that, like in the other two cases discussed 
above, there is lack of opinio juris for the formation of customary right of humanitarian 
intervention.146 
In sum, this brief examination of state practice during Cold War period shows the lack of 
opinio juris which is the necessary requirement for the formation of customary international 
law in addition to state practice. After recognized these cases as the three ‘best cases’ of 
humanitarian intervention in the Cold War period, Chesterman noted that even these cases 
lack the necessary opinio juris and thus remained an exception to the rule.147Thus, contrary 
to the Pre-Charter period, state practice throughout the Cold War period did not establish 
itself in customary international law for the right of humanitarian intervention. 
3.4.3 The practice in the post-Cold War period 
In the Post-Cold War period, the majority of armed conflicts were internal in character and 
this resulted in the growing number of UNSC resolutions which characterised gross 
violations of human rights in internal conflicts as a threat to international peace and 
security. In some cases the SC decided to impose economic sanctions while authorised the 
use of armed force in others. There were also unilateral interventions that implemented 
without the prior authorisation by UNSC. 
In Somalia, after the assassination of president shermarke  in 1969, Siad Barre seized power. 
The regime of Siad Barre became increasingly totalitarian. The Somali civil war started in 
1988. The state of chaos quickly spread throughout the country. By the summer of 1992, 1.2 
million people were displaced and 4.5 million were threatened with severe malnutrition. 
Various humanitarian relief efforts failed due to extreme insecurity for UN agencies and 
NGOs in distributing relief assistance to the people in need. Faced with a humanitarian 
disaster in Somalia, the UN had created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 
I) in April 1992 with a mandate to restore peace and protect humanitarian relief operations. 
However, the rivalries of the local warlords with each other meant that the mission of 
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UNOSOM I could not be performed. As the situation was deteriorating, in December 1992 
the SC unanimously adopted resolution 794, authorising the use of “all necessary means to 
establish ... a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations...”148 
The United Task Force (UNITAF) was established to perform this resolution. It was the 
United States led multinational force which entrusted to carry out the task stated in this 
resolution. By Resolution 794 (1992), the SC characterised a Somali humanitarian 
catastrophe as a threat to international peace and security. The UN Secretary-General 
stated that “the Security Council had ‘established a precedent in the history of the United 
Nations: it decided for the first time to intervene militarily for strictly humanitarian 
purposes’.”149However, UNITAF and the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) 
failed to restore peace in Somalia and the mission was terminated in 1995. 
Another instance of humanitarian intervention with a mandate of UNSC in the Post-Cold 
War period is the case of Rwanda. The ethnic tension between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda 
traces back to the Belgian colonial era. Intervention in Rwanda was a response to the 
genocide and civil war. The genocide in Rwanda estimated to have claimed between 
800,000 and 1.017,100 victims over 100 days. 1.3 million people fled to neighbouring 
countries and 2.2 million people internally displaced within four months.    
Eventually, on 20 June 1994 the French government proposed to UNSC to intervene 
unilaterally to halt the bloodshed and protect refugees.150On 22 June 1994, SC adopted 
Resolution 929, recognizing that the situation ‘constitutes a unique case which demands an 
argent response by the international community’ and determining ‘that the magnitude of 
the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region’. 
The Council authorised France, under chapter VII, to conduct an operation under national 
command and control aimed at contributing to the security and protection of displaced 
persons, refugees and civilians at risk, using ‘all necessary means’ to achieve these 
humanitarian purposes.151French forces stayed in Rwanda and neighbouring Zaire, 
establishing safe havens for refugees and helped distributed relief supplies. Finally, French 
troops withdrew from Rwanda after two months and urged the UN to send replacements as 
soon as possible.152The SC gave also authorisation for the establishment of International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).153 
As to intervention in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Bosnia), the war began in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Following the Slovenian and 
Croatian secessions in 1991, the multiethnic Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which was inhabited by, mainly Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, 
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passed a referendum for independence on 29 February 1992. This was rejected by Bosnian 
Serb political representatives, who had boycotted the referendum and established their 
own republic. Following the declaration of independence, Bosnian Serb forces, supported by 
Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) attacked 
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and war soon broke out across Bosnia, accompanied by 
the ethnic cleansing of the Bosniak population. Teson noted that the atrocities that were 
reported were of the same gravity and magnitude as those committed by Nazi during 
WWII.154 
In the summer of 1992, the UNSC authorised coercive measures in the conflict. The SC 
acting under Chapter VII, called upon states “to take nationally or through regional agencies 
or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations 
the delivery [...] of humanitarian assistance [...] in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”155Deeply concerned 
by the reports of abuses against civilians, the council recognized that the situation in Bosnia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. Faced with the failure of several 
efforts to protect Bosnian Muslims, the SC imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia in order to 
prevent Serbian assaults from obstructing transfer of humanitarian supplies.156 
But this was proved difficult to enforce. Thus, the Council took decisive step to influence the 
situation in the region and authorised member states to take “all necessary measures in the 
airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event of further violations to 
ensure compliance with the ban on flights.”157Under resolution 816, the Council made 
reference to the previous resolution 770 and emphasised the need to put an end, by force if 
necessary, to the victimization that Bosnia Serbs were inflicting on civilian population.  
On the basis of these two resolutions, NATO air forces conducted a series of military 
operation against Bosnian Serb position. Teson comments that while the initial UN 
authorisation to use air power seemed to be limited to securing the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and the enforcement of the “no-fly” zone, the intervention by 
NATO far exceeded those limited purposes.158Nevertheless, he concluded that: 
 The intervention by NATO can be explained in part as a humanitarian effort, that is, 
as an   action by a military alliance authorised by the United Nations with the purpose of 
putting an end to the intolerable human rights violations that were occurring in that war.159 
(Emphasis added). 
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Following the NATO demonstration, the belligerent parties initiated peace negotiations that 
concluded in the accord signed in Paris in December 1995.160 
Another intervention, frequently cited in the literature as having humanitarian character, 
occurred in the Post-Cold War period was the one that conducted unilaterally by NATO in 
Kosovo in 1998-99. The tension between ethnic Albania and ethnic Serbians in Kosovo 
traces back to the 20th Century, particularly during WWI and WWII. 
 At the time of the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo was autonomous 
province. But the Belgrade authorities removed that status in 1989. This fact was the main 
reason for the development of nationalist sentiments in both Kosovo and Serbia.161Internal 
civil war in Kosovo lasted from February 1998 to March 1999. NATO’s intervention and 
bombardments of Belgrade and other parts of the country was a response to this conflict 
which created humanitarian crisis. The fighting was between Kosovo Liberation Army and 
the federal forces. Although abuses were reported on both sides, it is Serb atrocities that 
are well documented. The Serb forces committed their most horrific massacres including 
‘ethnic cleansing’ in the attempt to terrorize, kill and expel ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. 
The UNSC and the European Union strongly condemned the atrocities. Although the UNSC 
declared the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo as a threat to the peace162, NATO’s 
intervention was carried out without the explicit authorisation of the Council. According to 
Teson, one striking feature of Kosovo incident is its being genuine instance of humanitarian 
intervention. He also suggested that “on the whole, the intervention was not overtly 
condemned by any international organization or human rights NGOs, although many 
deplored that NATO had been unable to secure Security Council authorisation.”163The 2000 
report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo disclosed that the 
intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long 
period of oppression under Serbian rule.164There were no strategic or material interests of 
NATO nations in Kosovo.165 Indeed, the dominant motivation of NATO was to counter the 
ongoing repression of the Kosovars by Milosevic regime. 
Another most recent instance of humanitarian intervention with a mandate of SC is the case 
of Libya. First, on Feb. 26, 2011 the SC called up on Libya’s responsibility to protect by 
referring the situation to the ICC and imposing initial financial sanctions and arms 
embargo.166And then on 17 March, the Council approved enforcement of no-fly zone, calling 
for an immediate cease-fire and for all necessary measures to protect civilians.167This 
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resolution condemned the Libyan government for allowing gross violations of human rights 
and attacks that may amount to crimes against humanity. 
In sum, in the Post-Cold War period, several resolutions of UNSC declared humanitarian 
crisis as threats to international peace and authorised states to intervene to end human 
sufferings. The practice in the Post-Cold War period indicates that international community 
used extensive conception of humanitarian intervention. Thus, it is safe to conclude that 
state practice in this period constituted evidence for the existence of the right of 
humanitarian intervention with the SC mandate. Its legality and legitimacy will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
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4 The legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention 
This chapter will examine the legal and legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention in 
relation to the principle of state sovereignty, non-intervention and regulation of the use of 
force in international law. It will address the main objective of this paper and attempts to 
answer the question as to whether legal and legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention 
exist under international law and if so, when and under whose authority? In this chapter 
humanitarian intervention with UN Security Council mandate and the one carried out 
without such a mandate   and their legality and legitimacy will be discussed below 
separately. 
4.1 Humanitarian intervention with a Security Council mandate 
This section discusses the power and role of the UNSC in the implementation of 
humanitarian intervention. The SC has the power and primary responsibility under the UN 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Over the years, the SC has 
not exercised its powers extensively against states that have engaged in gross and persistent 
violations of their citizens’ human rights due to the use or threatened use of the veto by one 
or more of the Council’s permanent five. However, in few cases the Council has found a 
state’s violations of human rights to constitute a threat to the peace and adopted 
mandatory sanctions against that state, for instance economic sanction against Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1966168and arms embargo against a partied rule in South Africa in 
1977.169Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War, the Council authorised intervention 
against states engaged in gross human rights violations. 
The question arises whether the SC has the authority, under the UN Charter, to conduct or 
authorise humanitarian intervention? 
It is generally agreed that the SC has the authority, under chapter VII of the UN Charter, to 
conduct or authorise humanitarian intervention.170Again the remaining question is when 
and how the intervention should be carried out? In general, the SC is empowered, under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use, or authorise the use, of force including forcible 
intervention when there exists a threat to international peace and security. It is worth 
reminding that under Article 24(1) of the Charter, members “confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agreed 
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.”171In turn, under Article 25, members “agree to accept and carry out the decision of 
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the Security Council.”172The SC has also the power to determine which member states shall 
be authorised to carry out its decisions.173 
In short, the specific powers granted to the SC which enable it to discharge its duties are 
found in chapter VII of the Charter. Article 39 provides: 
 The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the  peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall  be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace  and security. 
Article 41 authorises the SC to order economic sanctions against states that have violated 
Article 39, while Article 42 permits it to order military action including “demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United 
Nations.”174Chesterman observed that Article 39 of the UN Charter suggests “that a 
determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression must be 
made before the Security Council can decide what measures should be taken.”175(Emphasis 
added). So, it seems to be the case that the determination of the occurrence of, in particular 
“threats to the peace” is a prerequisite for the SC to take military action envisaged in article 
42 of the Charter. 
4.1.1 The requirement of a threat to the peace 
It is of considerable importance to know what types of conducts may fall within Article 39 of 
the UN Charter as it’s a precondition for enforcement measures to be taken by the SC. In 
short, what constitute “a threat to the peace”? 
None of those three phrases mentioned under Article 39, “threat to the peace”, “breach of 
the peace” and “act of aggression”, defined in the UN Charter. The historic context in which 
article 39 was drafted indicates that the intention of the drafters was to give the SC wide 
discretion to define these terms.176It was thought that an exhaustive list of “threat to the 
peace”, “breach of the peace” or “act of aggression” would be impossible as it limits the 
freedom of the SC to perform its duty in maintaining international peace and security.177 
In fact, armed military actions are encompassed by Article 39, but, inter alia, “threats to the 
peace” are not limited to military situations or international conflicts. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the SC has interpreted the phrase “threat to the peace” broadly as not limited 
only to inter-state conflicts. During the meeting of the Council at its 47th Session, on 31 
January 1992, it was confirmed that the absence of war and military conflicts among states 
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does not ensure in itself international peace and security, and further recognised that non-
military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields 
have become threats to peace and security.178 
Humanitarian crisis do have international consequences, in particular the flow of refugees 
across state borders. However, such crises, in general, do not pose the threat of armed 
conflict across border. So, the question arises whether humanitarian crises can be called 
threat to the peace. Nevertheless, the language of Article 39 expressly gives the SC the 
authority to determine what constitute a threat to the peace. Thus, it is the discretion of the 
SC to determine this matter.   
 
4.1.2 Humanitarian crises as threat to the peace 
Can large-scale and systematic violations of human rights in a given state amount to a threat 
to international peace and security sufficient to justify humanitarian intervention? 
It has been suggested that even though the Charter does not specifically grant the SC the 
authority to initiate military intervention to protect human rights in crisis situations, such 
inherent power recently was validated by resolutions of the Council in response to internal 
crisis.179The concept that respect for sovereignty is conditional on respect for human rights 
has been reflected in the practice of UNSC which has increasingly considered gross violation 
of human rights in internal conflicts as legal grounds for international action. When 
authorising humanitarian intervention, the SC typically determines that a humanitarian crisis 
poses a threat to the peace. 
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter stipulates that the Charter does not authorise the UN to 
intervene in “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. It 
has been suggested that this might seem to rule out authorised humanitarian 
intervention.180As the last sentence of this provision indicates, however, non-intervention 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter VII. It 
follows that Article 2(7) is generally not taken to limit the authority of the SC under chapter 
VII of the Charter. Today even the violation of fundamental human rights cannot be 
considered to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction. 
 As noted earlier, there has been a progressive development of international human rights 
law since the establishment of the UN and it has been recognised by ICJ in 1970, in 
Barcelona Traction Case, as most of fundamental rights of human person belong to Erga 
Omnes obligations. Javier Leon concluded that “the SC may take enforcement measures 
without taking into account the general principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs 
                                                          
178
  UN DOC. S/PV.3046 47th Session 1992 
179
  Lillich (1995) P.4 
180
  Stein (2004) P.17 
37 
 
of a state when determining whether a particular situation is a threat to international peace 
and security.”181Thus, humanitarian intervention is lawful if authorised by the UNSC as part 
of its collective security function. This is supported by the majority of scholars.182 
Some writers, however, tend to limit the authority of the SC to authorise intervention only if 
internal crisis has trans-boundary elements to justify intervention. For instance, Chesterman 
stated that “a credible argument can be made that refugee flows may, in some 
circumstances, constitute a threat to international peace and security.”183Indeed, in the 
early resolutions of the Council, trans-boundary effects of humanitarian crisis emphasised as 
a basis to justify chapter VII enforcement measures. But in recent SC practice, there has 
been a gradual shift away from reliance on trans-boundary repercussions of a situation to 
consider gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law in internal conflicts as 
threats to peace and security. The approach followed by the SC to characterise gross 
violations of human rights as threats to international peace and security in the Post-Cold 
War period has resulted in considering humanitarian catastrophes in internal conflicts with 
or without cross-border effects as constituting threats to international peace and security.  
In short, since the end of the Cold War, the SC has availed itself of a right of humanitarian 
intervention by adopting a series of resolutions which have progressively expanded the 
definition of “a threat to international peace and security” under Article 39 of the Charter 
and authorised member states to intervene even where such crises have been purely 
domestic in nature. This is what the SC did in the cases of Somalia184, Bosnia-
Herzegovina185and Rwanda.186However, some states objected to this broad interpretation of 
“a threat to international peace” on the ground that the SC may act arbitrarily in future 
cases.  
Regarding the question of when and how to intervene in a domestic crisis or how 
interventions should be carried out, Kardas suggested that “there has not emerged a 
consensus among states or within international organisations, including the UN.”187The UN 
practice was developed on a case by case approach. Nevertheless, when authorise states to 
conduct humanitarian intervention, the SC defines (1) the objectives states to pursue when 
using force; (2) the duration of the mandate; and (3) the duty to report to it on the conduct 
of military interventions. 
In recent practice of UNSC, the link is made between widespread human rights violations 
within a country and the threats of international peace and security. For example by using 
such languages as the following: “...deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human 
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suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the 
situation...constitutes a threat to international peace and security....”188 There were no 
reference to the human rights provisions of the Charter which require member states to 
take joint and collective action for the achievement of universal respect and observance for 
human rights.189Rather SC resolutions link human rights violations to the threats to 
international peace. Kardas noted that SC authorised interventions were justified not on a 
purely humanitarian basis, rather it was connected to international peace and security.190 
 There is an argument that the UNSC is not entitled under the Charter to authorise 
humanitarian intervention based purely on violations of human rights without cross-border 
repercussions. Regarding the legal status of humanitarian intervention with a UNSC 
mandate, Teson observed that “...international law today recognizes, as a matter of 
practice, the legitimacy of collective humanitarian intervention, that is, of military measures 
authorised by the Security Council for the purpose of remedying tyranny.”191He further 
concluded that “While traditionally the only ground for collective military action has been 
the need to respond to breaches of the peace [...] international community has accepted a 
norm that allows collective humanitarian intervention as a response to serious human rights 
abuses.”192 
 It is safe to conclude that internal crisis with external effects justify humanitarian 
intervention with SC mandate. Further, I argue here that international human rights law 
takes humanitarian intervention outside the ban on intervention in domestic affairs of 
states. The authority of the SC under chapter VII of the Charter is unimpaired to conduct or 
authorise humanitarian intervention in situations internal crisis produce humanitarian 
catastrophes with or without cross-border repercussions. Thus, the answer to the questions 
posed at the beginning of this section is that UNSC has legal authority, under chapter VII of 
the Charter, to conduct or authorise humanitarian intervention when a state engages in 
gross and persistent violations of its citizens’ human rights.  
4.2 Humanitarian intervention without a Security Council mandate 
(Unilateral humanitarian intervention)  
The linkage between human rights and international peace in the UNSC practice was widely 
recognised by the international community and humanitarian intervention with a mandate 
of the SC did not create so much controversy.193But if intervention is not authorised by the 
SC, its legality under the Charter is more controversial.194Although the UNSC authorised 
most of the Post-Cold War interventions, the practice of intervention without the SC 
                                                          
188
  UNSC Resolution 746(1992) on Somalia, Preamble 
189
  UN Charter arts 55 and 56 
190
  Kardas (2001) p.[] 
191
  Teson (2005) p.281 
192
  Ibid 
193
  Newman (2010) P.104 
194
  Ibid 
39 
 
mandate has not disappeared completely. In several instances states have intervened with 
force and without advance authorisation from the SC, at least in part to halt alleged 
violations of human rights. Recent examples include ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, 
intervention after the Gulf War to protect Kurds in northern Iraq as well as NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo. The Iraqi and Kosovo cases are quite complicated because there 
were prior SC resolutions defining the situation as a threat to peace, but none giving explicit 
authorisation for the use of military force. The debate about these cases has not been 
settled among scholars.  
4.2.1 Unilateral intervention and the UN Charter 
The question arises whether legal basis exist under the UN Charter for states to conduct 
humanitarian intervention without the SC mandate? 
Relevant to the legality of humanitarian intervention is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which 
prohibits the use of force in international relations. This provision is discussed above under 
chapter two of this paper, but it is worth reminding that this provision interpreted in 
different ways. Some interpret it in the context of the Charter as a whole, as prohibiting all 
use of force with only two exceptions: as authorised by the SC, and in exercise of the right of 
self defence recognised in Article 51 of the Charter.195Others disagree with this broad 
interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. They point out that the language of this 
provision imposes not a general prohibition, rather three specific prohibitions. They argue 
that unauthorised humanitarian intervention is permitted under this provision if it:  
1 Does not constitute the use of force against territorial integrity; 
2 Does not constitute the use of force against political independence; and 
3 Is not otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.196  
When the term ‘territorial integrity’ is interpreted broadly, every territorial incursion is a 
violation of territorial integrity. Under a more narrow interpretation of ‘territorial integrity, 
a state violates it only if it seizes part of the other state’s territory. It should be noted that 
even the more narrow interpretation of ‘territorial integrity’ raise a problem for unilateral 
intervention.  
When we interpret the term ‘political independence’, a state’s political independence is 
violated when interveners change its political path in any way. 
When we come to the last point-the use of force not otherwise inconsistent with the 
purposes of the UN-under article 1 of the Charter, the first-listed and the primary purpose 
of the UN is the   maintenance of international peace and security. The promotion and 
protection of human rights is also listed as a purpose of the organization. To ensure the 
maintenance of international peace, article 2(3) requires member states to settle their 
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disputes by peaceful means and not by use of force. In short, non-defensive unilateral use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state is a breach of peace 
and inconsistent with the primary purpose of the UN. It follows that article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter prohibits all non-defensive use of force not authorised by the UNSC and hence 
unilateral humanitarian intervention has no legal ground under the UN Charter. 
4.2.2 Unilateral intervention and customary 
international law 
In addition to the UN Charter, the legal status of humanitarian intervention may be affected 
by customary international law, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.197So, if 
there is no legal basis for unilateral humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter, then 
the question arises whether this right exists under customary international law either as 
survived the adoption of the UN Charter or as an emerging norm of customary law that has 
modified existing Charter regulations on use of force? 
 Elements of customary international law are: (1) state practice and (2) Opinio Juris (a 
conviction that state practice have legal obligation.) In short, international custom may 
become a law if state practice is uniform and extensive. Short passage of time is not 
necessarily a bar to the formation of customary international law.198In addition, this practice 
need not be in absolute uniformity but only of general consistency.199It is important to note 
that a state which has consistently expressed its opposition to such practice, for instance 
the practice of unilateral humanitarian intervention, will not be bound by any rule of 
customary international law emerging from that practice.200This is what we call persistent 
objectors rule. 
There is great controversy over the content of customary international law in the area of 
humanitarian intervention as in other areas. Some find a strong prohibition against 
unilateral intervention in customary international law while others find no prohibition 
against it. As noted earlier, the right of humanitarian intervention had a solid basis in Pre-
Charter state practice. But did it survived or co-exist with the Charter’s prohibition on use of 
force? 
Contrary to the Pre-Charter practice, in the Post-Charter period, in particular during the Cold 
War era, state practice did not establish itself in customary international law. For instance, 
India’s, Tanzania’s and Vietnamese actions constitute state practice for the purpose of 
customary law formation but there were little evidence of Opinio Juris. State practice in the 
Post-Cold War period cannot constitute precedents for a doctrine of unilateral intervention, 
nor can it establish a norm in customary international law. For instance, the debate about 
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NATO’s intervention in Kosovo has not been settled among scholars. Again, there were 
opposition to this intervention on the part of Russia and China in the UNSC and other states 
in the UNGA. This may amount to the concept of persistent objectors which is a bar to its 
being a precedent. 
From this brief examination of state practice, we can conclude that there is no crystallized 
customary international law (de lege lata) in the area of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. The Pre-existing customary law of humanitarian intervention did not survive or 
co-exist with the charter’s prohibition of non-defensive unilateral use of force. However, in 
theory the Charter can be amended through the process of emerging customary law (de 
lege ferenda). So, the question arises whether there is emerging customary norm of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention or the one that will emerge from state practice? 
A number of commentators believe that repeated humanitarian intervention without SC 
mandate could establish a right to humanitarian intervention or even a general permission 
to use of force in international relations. Both the Danish report201and the Dutch 
report202concluded that state practice after the end of the Cold War concerning 
humanitarian intervention is neither sufficiently substantial nor has there been sufficient 
acceptance in the international community to support the view that a right of humanitarian 
intervention without SC authorisation has become part of customary international law. But 
these reports suggested further that a legal justification asserting a new emerging right of 
unilateral intervention may, if supported by a vast majority of states, lead to the creation of 
corresponding new legal norms. 
 However, in my view, even if this may be true from the point of view of international law 
making process, it is difficult to think the possibility for the formation of such norm in 
contradiction with a jus cogens rules, such as the ban on the use of force. Because they are 
peremptory norm of international community from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can only be modified by subsequent norm of international law with the same 
character. To conclude from the foregoing, current international law, both under the UN 
Charter and customary international law, does not provide sufficient legal ground for 
humanitarian intervention without the UNSC mandate.  
4.2.3 Other justifications for the legitimacy of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention 
If unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegal under positive international law, what 
measures should be taken, in particular when the UNSC fails to take timely and decisive 
action, such as the Rwandan genocide case? If one proves unilateral humanitarian 
intervention to be at odds with the criterion of legality-since it clearly contradicts one of the 
main pillars of the UN Charter, i.e. the ban on non-defensive unilateral use of force-, can it 
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be justified with recourse to the concept of legitimacy? What is the distinction between 
‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’? 
For instance the Kosovo report hinges upon the distinction and the gap between law and 
legitimacy. The Kosovo Commission concluded that the NATO military intervention was 
‘illegal but legitimate.’203It was illegal because there was no way to reconcile such a use of 
force with international law and the UN Charter. At the same time it was legitimate in terms 
of its aim to prevent an imminent humanitarian calamity and because the evidence 
supported the claim of humanitarian emergency. The Commission enumerated a series of 
guidelines to give support to its sense of legitimacy, including adherence to international 
humanitarian law governing the conduct of such an operation and reliance on force as a last 
resort.  
Here, it is worth examining whether the distinction between ‘legality’ and ‘legitimacy’ can 
be of any use in assessing justifications for unilateral humanitarian intervention. The 
concept of ‘legality’ recalls that of law: an action or a decision is considered legal when it 
complies with a positive rule belonging to a legal system. Thus, ‘the notion of legality’-is the 
intervention lawful?-is a purely legal concept. So, unilateral humanitarian intervention is 
illegal because it does not comply with the UN Charter’s and general international law’s 
prohibition of use of force. 
When we turn to the question of legitimacy, it appears to be more complicated. There is no 
general definition for it, nor does it necessarily refer to positive law. Legitimacy is 
intertwined with morality and ethics, since it is often seen as a justification for political and 
legal power. However, we can provide general understanding of it and of its connections 
with legality. The ordinary meaning of legitimacy is the validity or justifiability of an action, 
something for which there is a fair and acceptable reason.204Technically, legitimacy along 
with legality requires that the substance of the legal system is to be consistent with the 
diffused conceptions of the social parties, that is, law/legality has to adopt itself to the key 
values and to the basic ideals of the political community. 
Both the Dutch report205and the Danish report206 affirmed the exclusive legal authority 
under international law of the UNSC to take decisions on humanitarian intervention, yet 
both argued that ‘in extreme cases’, humanitarian intervention may be necessary and 
justified on moral and political grounds even if an authorisation from the UNSC cannot be 
obtained. They observed that the scope of sovereignty has gradually been reduced due to 
international norms and requirements of human rights. These reports seek to clarify the 
circumstances under which intervention is necessary; the procedures that should be 
followed in order to ensure that alternative non-military options have been exhausted; and 
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operational steps and safeguards that optimise the legitimacy and effectiveness of the use 
of force. 
 According to these reports, there is a growing international consensus on basic criteria and 
the threshold for intervention which can be regarded as genocide, crimes against humanity 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Finally, they suggested, 
without offering a solution, that the position of international law may inadvertently be 
undermined if it does not provide for intervention in cases of flagrant violations of 
fundamental human rights. Thus, the dilemma of unilateral humanitarian intervention is not 
solved.  
To conclude, humanitarian intervention is lawful if authorised by the UNSC in cases of 
flagrant and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights. Although there is an 
argument to the effect that unilateral humanitarian intervention in extreme cases may be 
justified on moral and political grounds, such kind of intervention has no legal basis under 
positive international law. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The two major values, respect for state sovereignty and respect for human rights were 
integrated to international law with the adoption of the UN Charter. The principle of 
sovereignty is the foundation of inter-state relations and the basis of the modern world. It is 
the old principle of international law. On the other hand, the principle imposing respect for 
human rights is typical of a new stage of development in international community following 
the WWII. The coexistence of these two principles has not been easy. They often confronted 
than partnered. Sovereign equality of states together with the principle of non-intervention 
also incorporated to the UN Charter. In short, the fundamental rule of international law 
prescribes that states are duty bound not to intervene in the preserve of other states 
domestic affairs. 
 However, the scope of this principle has gradually been reduced due to international norms 
and requirements on human rights and no longer antagonizes but rather incorporates the 
concept of human rights. The redefinition of sovereignty to include a duty to respect human 
rights is widely reinforced in contemporary international law. Even if state sovereignty 
remains the basic norm of international law, a state cannot pretend absolute sovereignty 
without demonstrating a duty to protect human rights. International law becomes more 
permissive regarding cross-border intervention to protect human rights. Thus, where a state 
engages in systematic and large-scale violations of its citizens’ fundamental human rights, 
the international community through UNSC may forcefully intervene to end such violations. 
 The linkage between human rights violations and threats to international peace in the 
UNSC practice was widely recognized by the international community and humanitarian 
intervention authorised by the SC did not create so much controversy. The power of the SC 
is not limited by the normal duty on the UN not to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of 
member states. Thus, the authority of the SC under charter VII of the Charter is unimpaired 
to conduct or authorise humanitarian intervention in situations internal crisis produce 
humanitarian catastrophes with or without cross-border repercussions. But if intervention is 
not authorised by the UNSC, its legality under international law is more controversial.  
The UN Charter prohibits all non-defensive use of force not authorised by the UNSC and 
hence unilateral humanitarian intervention has no legal grounds under the UN Charter. The 
pre-existing customary law of unilateral humanitarian intervention did not survive or co-
exist with the Charter’s prohibition of non-defensive unilateral use of force. Thus, there is 
no crystallized customary international law (de lege lata) in the area of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention.  
In sum, current international law, both under the UN Charter and customary international 
law, does not provide sufficient legal ground for unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention, in extreme cases, may arguably be justified on moral 
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and political grounds, but such kind of intervention has no legal basis under positive 
international law. 
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